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Abstract. Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker
updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses
an action, and receives a payo® that depends on the state and
the action taken. An information structure determines the set of
possible signals and the probability of each signal given a state.
For a ¯xed decision problem (consisting of a state space, action set
and utility function) the value of an information structure is the
maximal expected utility that the decision maker can get when the
observed signals are governed by this structure.
This note studies the functions de¯ned over information struc-
tures that measure their value. It turns out that two conditions
play a major role in the characterization of these functions: addi-
tive separability and convexity.
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Blackwell (1951, 1953) compared di®erent information structures.
He de¯ned two orders over the set of information structures: one in
terms of decision problems and one in purely probabilistic terms. He
showed the equivalence of these two orders. In this note we discuss the
same model of stochastic information structures but deal with another
issue: the value of information.
A decision maker (DM) has a prior distribution over the true state
of nature. Before taking a decision she receives a stochastic signal
that depends on the state realized. The set of possible signals and
the probability of each signal given the state are determined by the
particular information structure of the case. Upon receiving a signal
the DM updates her belief and takes an action that maximizes her
expected utility.
An outside observer collects data about the DM. He cannot observe
the DM's prior distribution nor her actions, while he knows through
which information structure the DM receives her signals and the utility
associated with each structure. The question arises as to what kind of
observations can be rationalized within the Bayesian paradigm. In
other words, what conditions the data should satisfy in order to be
consistent with a behavior of a utility maximizer in a Bayesian decision
problem?
More speci¯cally, a decision problem is de¯ned by a state space, a
prior distribution, an action set and a utility function. For a given
decision problem, di®erent information structures determine poten-
tially di®erent maximal achievable expected utilities. Thus, a decision
problem implicitly induces a function that attaches to any information
structure its corresponding value. We deal here with these functions
(de¯ned over information structures) and provide conditions that char-
acterize them. These conditions can be used by an outside observer to
tell whether the observations are consistent with the behavior of a ra-
tional agent in a Bayesian model.
1The problem of weather the data collected by an outside observer
is consistent with the Bayesian model is similar in spirit to a question
answered by Afriat (1967). Afriat (1967) dealt with a database that
contains di®erent prices and their corresponding consumption bundles.
He found the conditions that such a database should satisfy in order
to be consistent with a behavior of a utility maximizing consumer in a
competitive market.
One property of such information functions is already well-known.
Blackwell (1951, 1953) de¯ned one information structure, say I, as bet-
ter than another (I0) if, whatever the decision problem is, the expected
utility of the DM is higher when the information structure is I. He
showed that I is better than I0 if and only if the signal produced by
I can be used to simulate the signal produced by I0 (I is more infor-
mative than I0). Thus, every information function is monotonic with
respect to the more informative order.
Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) investigated properties of information func-
tions whose domain is restricted to the set of deterministic information
structures. In such information structures the signal observed by the
DM is uniquely determined by the state of nature. Therefore, every
deterministic information structure generates a partition of the state
space, where an atom of the partition corresponds to a signal. This al-
lows one to translate the model into terms of cooperative games: states
of nature take the role of players, and atoms of the partition take the
role of coalitions. Furthermore, the worth of a coalition is the maximal
utility achievable on the corresponding atom.
When the information structure is stochastic, the translation to co-
operative games is not possible anymore. Instead, an information func-
tion is expressed by means of another function de¯ned over posteriors.
It turns out that the key characteristic of an information function is
that this function (de¯ned over the set of posteriors) is convex.
The note is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is presented
and the notion of information function is de¯ned. Section 3 discusses an
2important property of information functions: additive separability. In
Section 4 the main result of this note is proved. Section 5 is dedicated
to decision problems having ¯nite action set. We conclude with Section
6 which addresses the relation to the entropy and other functions that
measure the contents of information.
2. The model
Let ­ = f!1;:::;!ng be a ¯nite set of states of nature, and let ¹ be
the prior probability over ­. It is assumed that ¹ assigns a positive
probability to any state. That is, ¹(!) > 0 for every ! 2 ­. The set
of actions available to the DM is denoted by A. The utility of the DM
when she takes the action a 2 A and when the state of nature is ! 2 ­
is denoted by u(a;!).
An information structure is a pair I = (S;M), where S is the set of
signals and M is a collection of distributions on S, one for each state.
M can be thought of as a stochastic matrix with n rows; the i-th row
of M (for 1 · i · n) is the distribution over signals given the state
!i. Stated di®erently, the cell Mis of the matrix M is the probability
of receiving the signal s 2 S given that the state of nature is !i. Note
that the number of columns in M coincides with the number of signals
in S. For the sake of simplicity, we always write m instead of jSj, where
no confusion can arise.
Denote by I the set of all information structures.
For a given information structure I = (S;M), denote by ¼I = (¼s
I)s2S




the probability of observing s. Also, for s 2 S, let qI;s = (q1
I;s;:::;qn
I;s)
be the distribution on ­ given that the observed signal is s. Formally,
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A (pure) strategy of the DM is a function ¾ : S ! A which dictates
the action to be chosen after observing each of the signals. If the
information structure is I = (S;M) and the DM follows a strategy ¾,


















^ ¾I is an optimal strategy, subject to the information structure I, if
it maximizes EI;¾. In other words, ^ ¾I is optimal if for every s 2 S,







b 2 A. We assume that an optimal strategy exists.




I;su(^ ¾I(s);!i). vI(s) is the maximal expected utility that
the DM can obtain upon observing s. Notice that vI(s) depends only
on the posterior distribution qI;s: if qI;s1 = qI;s2, then vI(s1) = vI(s2).
2.1. Information functions. Consider a decision problem character-
ized by ­, ¹, A and u. The DM may obtain information about the
realized state through various information structures. Each informa-
tion structure entails a di®erent maximal achievable expected payo®.
The main issue of this note is measuring the value of information struc-
tures.
The value of an information structure is de¯ned as the maximal
expected utility achievable when signals are received according to it.
The information function attaches to each information structure its
value. Formally,
De¯nition 1. A function V : I ! R is an information function if
there exist a set of actions A and a utility function u : A£­ ! R such
that V (I) =
P
s2S ¼s
IvI(s) for every I = (S;M) 2 I.
The goal is to study information functions. More speci¯cally, we are
interested in characterizing those functions de¯ned over information
structures that are information functions of some decision problem.
43. Additive separability
De¯nition 2. V : I ! R is additively separable if there exist a




I 2 I. If v is such a function we will say that v corresponds to V .
It is obvious that any information function is additively separable.
We are about to describe natural properties of the function V that
are equivalent to additive separability. For that purpose we need the
following notation.
Notation 1. For any information structure I = (S;M) and a subset
of signals T µ S,
(a) I(T) = (S(T);M(T)) is the information structure de¯ned as fol-
lows: S(T) = (S n T) [ ftg. If s 2 S n T then M(T)is = Mis, and if
s = t then M(T)is =
P
s02T Mis0, for every 1 · i · n.
(b) I(T) = (S(T);M(T)) is the information structure de¯ned as fol-
lows: Every signal t 2 T is replaced by a set of n signals St = ft1;:::;tng,
so the new set of signals is S(T) = (S n T)
S
([t2TSt). For s 2
S n T; M(T)is = Mis (1 · i · n). For tk 2 St (for some t 2 T),
if i = k then M(T)itk = Mi;t and if i 6= k then M(T)itk = 0.
(c) For two disjoint sets of signals T1;T2 µ S; I(T1;T2) = I(T1)(T2).
In words, I(T) is the information structure which di®ers from I only
in that the columns corresponding to the signals in T are summed up
to form one column. Instead of being informed separately of the signals
in T, the DM is informed that one of the signals in T occurred. That
is, the signals in T are lumped together. On the other hand, I(T) is the
information structure which is identical to I on S nT, and any column
corresponding to some s 2 T is replaced by a diagonal n £ n matrix.
De¯nition 3. A function V : I ! R is Independent of Irrelevant
Signals (IIS) if
V (I(T1)) + V (I(T2)) = V (I(T1;T2)) + V (I) (1)
5for every information structure I = (S;M) and for every two disjoint
subsets of signals T1;T2 µ S.
To justify the term IIS, notice that equation (1) can be rewritten as
V (I)¡V (I(T1)) = V (I(T2))¡V (I(T1;T2)). The left-hand side of this
equation is equal to the loss incurred to the DM due to coarsening the
information structure: instead of being informed of each signal in T1
separately, the signals of T1 are lumped together. This is the value of
the information embedded in the set T1 when the information struc-
ture is I. If equation (1) holds for every information structure I and
for every subset of signals T2, it means that this value is independent
of I. This is so, because when T2 = S nT1, the right-hand side of equa-
tion (1) depends only on T1. Therefore, the left-hand side is constant
across all information structures that contain T1. This implies that the
contribution of a set of signals (columns in the stochastic matrix) to
the value of information is independent of the informational structure
out of this set.
De¯nition 4. A function V : I ! R is reducible if for every infor-
mation structure I = (S;M) and for any pair of signals s1;s2 2 S such
that qI;s1 = qI;s2, V (I(fs1;s2g)) = V (I).
Proposition 1. V : I ! R is additively separable i® it is IIS and
reducible.
Proof. Assume ¯rst that V is additively separable. Then there exists
v : ¢(­) ! R such that V (I) =
P
s2S ¼s
Iv(qI;s) for every I 2 I. It is
straightforward to see that V is reducible. To check that V is IIS, ¯x
6some I 2 I and let T1;T2 be two disjoint subsets of signals. We have,




























































= V (I) + V (I(T1;T2)):
So V is IIS.
Conversely, assume that V is IIS and reducible. We need to prove the




for every I 2 I.
In order to ¯nd an appropriate function v, we ¯rst need to de¯ne two
auxiliary information structures for every vector x = (x1;:::;xn) with
0 · xi · 1; i = 1;2;:::;n. The ¯rst one is denoted Bx;1 and has n+1





x1 0 0 ::: 1 ¡ x1
0 x2 0 ::: 1 ¡ x2
. . .
. . . ... . . .





The second information structure is denoted Bx;2 and has only 2 signals.





x1 1 ¡ x1
x2 1 ¡ x2
. . .
. . .





Finally, let Id denote the deterministic information structure with n
signals, under which the DM is fully informed about the true state of
nature.
Notice that, since the prior distribution on ­ is ¹, qI;s is always of the
form1 qI;s =
¹±x






1For any two vectors x = (x1;:::;xn) and y = (y1;:::;yn), x±y denotes the vector
of the same length whose i-th coordinate is equal to xiyi.
7V (Id) ¡
V (Bx;1)¡V (Bx;2)
k¹±xk1 . To ¯nish the proof, it only remains to check
that if v is de¯ned as above then V (I) =
P
s2S ¼s
Iv(qI;s) for every I 2 I.






























V (I(fsg)) ¡ V (I)
¢
:




V (I(fsg)) ¡ V (I)
¢




Iv(qI;s) = V (Id) ¡ V (I(S)) + V (I). It only remains
to check that V (Id) = V (I(S)). However, since V is reducible we are
done.
We conclude this section with a short discussion on the uniqueness
of the function v. A function v : ¢(­) ! R uniquely determines a




given some additively separable function V , the corresponding v is not
unique. The following proposition states that v1 and v2 both corre-
spond to V i® v1 ¡ v2 is a linear function which vanish at the prior
distribution ¹.
Proposition 2. Assume that V : I ! R is additively separable with
v1 corresponding to it. Then, v2 also corresponds to V , if and only if
there exists a vector x 2 Rn such that2 x¹ = 0 and v1(q) ¡ v2(q) = xq
for every q 2 ¢(­).
Proof. Assume that for a certain x 2 Rn and for every q 2 ¢(­),
v2(q) = v1(q) ¡ xq. Moreover, assume that x¹ = 0. We show that v2
corresponds to V .








































Mis = V (I) ¡ x¹ = V (I):
Therefore, v2 also corresponds to V .
In the other direction, assume that v2 corresponds to V and de¯ne
v = v1 ¡ v2. Let qj = (q1
j;:::;qn
j ); j = 1;2, be two distributions









¹(!i), where c is a positive constant that satis¯es ri
1+ri
2 · 1
for every i = 1;:::;n. Finally, de¯ne r3 = (1;:::;1) ¡ r1 ¡ r2. Consider
the information structure I = (S;M), where S = fs1;s2;s3g, and M is
the n£3 matrix whose j'th column is rj; j = 1;2;3. Since both, v1 and








c®v(q1) + c(1 ¡ ®)v(q2) = (c ¡ 1)v(q3): (2)
Set T = fs1;s2g. For j = 1;2 we obtain, V (I(T)) = cvj(®q1 + (1 ¡
®)q2) + (1 ¡ c)vj(q3), which is equivalent to
cv(®q1 + (1 ¡ ®)q2) = (c ¡ 1)v(q3): (3)
>From (2) and (3) it follows that ®v(q1)+(1¡®)v(q2) = v(®q1+(1¡
®)q2) for every two distributions q1;q2 and for every ® 2 [0;1]. In other
words, v = v1 ¡ v2 is linear on ¢(­). Thus, there is x 2 Rn such that
v1(q) ¡ v2(q) = xq. Finally, since v1 and v2 agree on the information
structure with only one signal, x¹ = v1(¹) ¡ v2(¹) = 0.
94. Characterization of information functions
De¯nition 5. A function V : I ! R is convex if V (I(T)) · V (I) for
every information structure I = (S;M) and for every subset of signals
T µ S.
Remark 1: Blackwell (1951, 1953) de¯ned the more informative par-
tial order over information structures. Let I = (S;M) and I0 = (S0;M0)
be two information structures. I is more informative than I0, if there
is a stochastic matrix,3 say C, such that M0 = MC. That is, M0 can
be obtained by multiplying M with a stochastic matrix. We say that a
function V de¯ned over I has the Blackwell property, if V (I) ¸ V (I0),
whenever I is more informative than I0. The information structure I is
more informative than I(T), and therefore, if V has the Blackwell prop-
erty, then V (I) ¸ V (I(T)). That is, if V has the Blackwell property,
then it is convex. Blackwell (1951, 1953) showed that any information
function has the Blackwell property and is, therefore, convex.
We conclude that any information function is additively separable
and convex. In order to show that these conditions are also su±cient,
we ¯rst need to prove the following lemma which relates the convexity
of V with the convexity of v that corresponds to it.
Lemma 1. Let V : I ! R be additively separable function and v
corresponds to V . Then, V is convex if and only if v is convex on
¢(­).
Proof. Let qj = (q1
j;:::;qn
j ); j = 1;2 be two distributions over ­, and
let ® 2 [0;1]. We start by showing that if V is convex then ®v(q1) +
(1 ¡ ®)v(q2) ¸ v(®q1 + (1 ¡ ®)q2).









is a positive constant that satis¯es ri
1 + ri
2 · 1 for every i = 1;:::;n.
Let r3 = (1;:::;1) ¡ r1 ¡ r2 and consider the information structure
3A stochastic matrix is a matrix whose entries are all non-negative and the sum
of each row is 1.
10I = (S;M), where S = fs1;s2;s3g, and M is an n £ 3 matrix whose
j-th column is rj; j = 1;2;3:
Note that V (I) =
P
s2S ¼s
Iv(qI;s) = c®v(q1) + c(1 ¡ ®)v(q2) + (1 ¡
c)v(q3), where q3 =
r3±¹
kr3±¹k1. If T = fs1;s2g then V (I(T)) = cv(®q1 +
(1 ¡ ®)q2) + (1 ¡ c)v(q3). Since V is convex, V (I) ¸ V (I(T)). Thus,
c®v(q1)+c(1¡®)v(q2)+(1¡c)v(q3) ¸ cv(®q1+(1¡®)q2)+(1¡c)v(q3),
which implies that ®v(q1) + (1 ¡ ®)v(q2) ¸ v(®q1 + (1 ¡ ®)q2).
In the other direction, assume that v is convex and let T µ S be a
subset of signals of some information structure I = (S;M). Recall that
the set of signals in the information structure I(T) is (S nT)[ftg and
the column corresponding to the signal t is the sum of columns of the


















¼tv(qI;s) = V (I):
Therefore, V is convex.
Proposition 3. If V : I ! R is additively separable and convex, then
it is an information function.
Proof. Let V be an additively separable and convex function, and let
v correspond to V . By Lemma 1, v is convex on ¢(­). Therefore,
at every point r in the simplex, there is a vector xr = (x1
r;:::;xn
r)
(that de¯nes the tangent to the graph of v at the point r) such that
v(q) ¸ qxr for every q with equality when q = r. In particular v(q) =
qxq = maxr qxr.
De¯ne the set of actions, A, to be identical to the simplex. When the
state realized is !i and the action taken is r, the utility, u(r;!i), is de-
¯ned to be xi
r. Thus, when the distribution over states is q = (q1;:::;qn)
and the action taken is r, the expected utility is
P
i qiu(r;!i) = qxr.
Hence, when the posterior distribution over states is q, the optimal
action is q and the expected utility is qxq = v(q).
11Remark 2: The action set A de¯ned in the previous proof is the sim-
plex of distributions over ­, which is a compact set. Since v is convex,
it is almost surely di®erentiable. It implies that qxr, as a function of
r, is almost surely continuous. (Recall that xr de¯nes a tangent to the
graph of v at r. Thus, as a function of r, it may have discontinuity
at the kink points of v.) Therefore, the utility function u de¯ned on
A £ ­ is almost surely continuous.
We therefore proved the following theorem:
Theorem 1. V : I ! R is an information function if and only if it is
additively separable and convex.
Remark 3: (i) By Lemma 1, Theorem 1 can be rephrased as follows:
V : I ! R is an information function if and only if it is additively
separable and every function v that corresponds to it is convex.
(ii) As indicated in Remark 1, if a function V has the Blackwell prop-
erty, then it is convex. Therefore, Theorem 1 can be rephrased as
follows: V is an information function if and only if it is additively
separable and has the Blackwell property.
Remark 4: Theorem 1 refers to the case where the state space, ­, and
the prior distribution ¹ are known to the outside observer. It charac-
terizes those observations that are consistent with a rational behavior
of a decision maker in a Bayesian setting, given that the prior is ¹.
One may ask a similar question for an unknown prior. That is, when
are the observations consistent with a rational behavior of a decision
maker with some prior ¹?
Regarding ­, if we assume that the outside observer can see the
information structure, then we implicitly assume that he can also see
the state space (or at least its cardinality). However, the observer need
not know the prior beliefs of the DM.
The properties IIS and convexity of an information function V do not
depend on the prior distribution ¹. The reducibility condition, although
12phrased in terms of the posteriors qI;s, could be rephrased without re-
sorting to any particular prior: for any pair of signals s1;s2 2 S whose
corresponding columns are proportional, V (I(fs1;s2g)) = V (I). This
implies that if V has these three properties, then for any distribution
¹, as long as it has a full support (all the states are assigned positive
probability), V is an information function of a decision problem with
¹ being its prior. In other words, V is an information function with a
certain prior having full support if and only if it is an information func-
tion with any prior having full support. It should be noted, however,
that the corresponding v might change with the prior.
5. Finite action set
Theorem 1 ensures the existence of an action set, typically an in¯-
nite one. The question arises as to when a function is an information
function of a decision problem having a ¯nite set of actions.
De¯nition 6. A real function v de¯ned on the simplex is piecewise-
linear if there are ¯nitely many disjoint sets W1;:::;Wk in the sim-
plex, such that4 [k
i=1clWi covers the entire simplex and v is linear over
Wi; i = 1;:::;k:
Theorem 2. A function V : I ! R is an information function of a
decision problem with ¯nitely many actions if and only if it is additively
separable and any v corresponding to it is a piecewise-linear and convex
function.
Proof. Let A be a ¯nite action set. For a ¯xed a 2 A, the function
u(a;q) =
P
i qiu(a;!i) is a linear function of q. Furthermore, v(q) =
maxa2A u(a;q). Thus, v is a maximum of ¯nitely many linear functions,
and is, therefore, piecewise-linear and convex. It follows, that if v
corresponds to V , where the decision problem has a ¯nite actions set,
then v must be piecewise-linear and convex.
4clW is the closure of W.
13Conversely, if v is a piecewise-linear and convex, then v is the maxi-
mum of ¯nitely many linear functions. As in the proof of Theorem 1,
by identifying the set of actions with this ¯nite set of linear functions,
one can show that V is an information function.
6. Measuring information by entropy
The entropy function that measures the contents of information plays
a major role in various ¯elds such as information theory, Ergodic the-
ory and probability. The entropy of the distribution q, denoted e(q),
is de¯ned as
P
i ¡qi log(qi). This function is concave and attains its
maximum where the uncertainty is maximal: at the uniform distribu-
tion. Using this function one can de¯ne the entropy of an information







e(I) is the weighted average of the entropy of all the posteriors. The
greater the entropy the greater the uncertainty about the state. Like
the entropy of distributions, the entropy over information structures
attains its maximum when the structure is perfectly non-informative;
that is, when the DM obtains no information about the state realized.
It turns out that the entropy measurement does not entirely cap-
ture the essence of being more informative. As shown in the following
example, the entropy of the information structure I may be smaller
than that of I0, and yet, I is not more informative than I0. It should
be emphasized though that due to the concavity of the entropy, the
converse is true: If I is more informative than I0, then its entropy is
smaller or equal to that of I0.
Example 1: Let ­ be consisting of two equally likely states, S =


































4). Thus, e(I) < e(I0) and therefore I
contains more information than I0 with respect to the entropy mea-
surement. However, there is no stochastic matrix C that satis¯es
M0 = MC. We conclude that I is not more informative than I0 (recall
Remark 1), although the entropy of I is smaller than the entropy of I0.
Theorem 1 refers to convexity and it is therefore more convenient
in this context to refer to the convex function ¡e (minus entropy)
rather than to the entropy itself. The convexity of ¡e (which implies
that if I is more informative than I0, then ¡e(I) ¸ ¡e(I0)) is its
only important property5. Thus, in order to measure the informational
contents of a distribution one could replace ¡e by any other convex
function de¯ned over distributions, say w. The domain of w can be
extended to information structures in a similar way it was done in (4).
This extension, like ¡e, has the property that if I is more informative
than I0, then w(I) is greater than or equal to w(I0).
A convex function w induces a complete order over information struc-
tures in the following manner:
De¯nition 7. Let w be a convex function de¯ned over ¢(­) and let
I and I0 be two information structures. I contains at least as much
information as I0 with respect to w, if w(I) ¸ w(I0).
Theorem 1 implies that the partial order `more informative' as de-
¯ned by Blackwell (1951, 1953) is the intersection of the complete or-
ders `contains at least as much information with respect to w, when the
intersection is taken over all convex functions w. Formally,
5The entropy plays a signi¯cant role in other ¯elds due to its concavity and to
other properties which are irrelevant to the subject of information structures.
15Corollary 1. I is more informative than I0 if and only if for any
convex function w, I contains at least as much information as I0 with
respect to w.
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